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Confronting Ethical Issues in National Security Cases:
The Guantánamo Habeas Litigation
Shayana Kadidal

*

I have been asked to say a few words about legal ethics issues that
have arisen over the nearly decade-long Guantánamo detainee
litigation, the entirety of which I have been fortunate enough to
observe while working at the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR).
To start, I would be remiss if I failed to recommend a wonderful
example of empirical scholarship on this topic, David Luban’s
1
Lawfare and Legal Ethics at Guantánamo, which the author based on
many interviews with habeas and military defense counsel.
One of the things Professor Luban notes is that the adversary system works well (or, at least, in the way it was ideally intended to work)
only when the adversaries focus on presenting their strongest arguments for ultimate resolution by the court, instead of gaming the system by (1) trying to exclude or prevent the development of legitimate reliable evidence, (2) intimidating litigants or witnesses from
participating in litigation, or (3) simply overwhelming or exhausting
2
the other side’s resources.
In my view, the government’s classification practices in these
cases have gamed the system in all three ways, and I would like to
spend some time describing how rules, ostensibly designed to secure
information that might cause harm to the government if made public, in practice serve to hinder effective representation in an adversarial system (that is, putting aside concerns about whether they are
also intended to hide not sensitive but rather embarrassing information—evidence of official incompetence or abuse). These issues
quickly overlap with concerns about our own participation in these
cases, which raise some of the most interesting ethical questions precisely because we usually ignore them once we have become close to
*

Senior Managing Attorney, Guantánamo Global Justice Initiative, Center for
Constitutional Rights; J.D., Yale 1994. Thanks to Wells Dixon for many useful suggestions and Maria LaHood for helpful citations.
1
David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics at Guantánamo, 60 STAN. L. REV 1981
(2008).
2
Id. at 1985.
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these cases: To what extent does our mere participation in a process
set up to be procedurally unfair serve to legitimate the process
and/or undermine the interests of our clients?
***
Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s opinion in Al Odah in October 2004 basically set the conditions for attorney access that now govern in the
Guantánamo cases: habeas attorneys will have unmonitored access to
detainees in exchange for presumptive classification of their meeting
notes, subject to classification review by a walled-off Privilege Review
3
Team (PRT). The PRT is composed of intelligence and Justice Department officials who are not (and will not ever be) involved in liti4
gation respecting these detainees. The written notes from such
meetings are considered presumptively classified by the government,
as are the very contents of the communications exchanged during
5
such meetings —meaning that if a lawyer has a great idea in the middle of the night about a factual point in a case deriving from something said in a meeting, she cannot scribble it down on a notepad on
her nightstand, but instead has to travel to the Secure Facility located
in Crystal City, Virginia (there is only one), and commit it to paper
6
there. Of course, the idea that everything a client says is per se classified until further notice from the government carries with it the corollary that the attorneys working on these cases must first receive security clearances before they travel to the base to visit their erstwhile
clients. Never mind that this all implies that the clients are carrying
7
around reams of classified information in their heads. The baseline
assumption—that a client’s own statements can be classified even
though the client lacks security clearance and has not received the
information from the government—has created absurd results as the
3

Al Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2004).
Id. at 3 n.2.
5
Id. at 13.
6
In practice, some of this is ameliorated by clearance of notes by the PRT, but
by and large, anything substantive in the cases remains classified, meaning not only
that it cannot be worked with outside of the Secure Facility but also that it evades firsthand media scrutiny.
7
They obviously do not have clearances. They could not get the special type of
SECRET level clearance required by the government even if they tried, as one must
hold U.S. citizenship to obtain such clearance. Dual citizens qualify. The Court Security Office has never reduced this to writing; the protective order does not specify
anything more than that the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Security Officer decides
this issue. See Protective Order and Procedures for Counsel Access to Detainees at
the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, In re Guantanamo Detainee
Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 143, 148 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Protective Order
and Procedures].
4
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litigation has matured. For example, after Boumediene, the government has insisted that a client’s own draft declaration, sent to his lawyer for review, be classified such that parts of it could not be shown to
9
the client again during meetings. This position is at least consistent
with earlier assertions that transcripts of a client’s own statements,
supposedly given to military interrogators years earlier, may be classified so that the client cannot review what he is purported to have
10
said.
Essentially, this initial protective order was the product of a
trade-off: the Court rejected the government’s proposal for real-time
monitoring of attorney-client meetings but, in exchange, allowed for
11
classification of meeting notes and post-hoc review. The scheme was
not revisited after Boumediene. Throughout the post-Rasul v. Bush
12
period, the government’s position on these issues was motivated by
the idea of using habeas attorneys as, effectively, an extension of the
13
interrogation process.
“Although the government was careful to
omit this from their briefs, [at oral argument in the district court],
the government also indicated that it plans to exploit the ‘intelli14
gence value’ of monitoring Petitioners’ conversations with counsel.”
As the government attorney put it: “I don’t understand why the court
would think that problematic if the information is not going to be
15
used to test the legality of [Petitioners’] detention.” Indeed, the
idea is consistent with the contemporaneously created “personal representative” in the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT)
16
process, which was instituted nine days after the Rasul decision.
8

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
This incident—one of many—occurred during the litigation of Ameziane v.
Bush, No. 05-cv-392, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108518 (D.D.C. 2008).
10
In these instances the government argues that the interrogator’s choice of
what to make note of—what to record and what to ignore—conveys information
from the client’s head and from a government employee’s head (the interrogator’s)
and thus is legitimately classified. Government’s Motion to Amend Sept. 11, 2008,
Protective Order and Counsel Access Procedures and January 9, 2009, Amended
TS / SCI Protective Order and Counsel Access Procedures, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-mc-442 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2009).
11
See Al Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2004) (denying
“real time monitoring . . . . contingent on Petitioners’ compliance with” framework
described in text, as set forth at August 16, 2004, hearing).
12
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
13
Al Odah, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 1, 10 n.11.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Memorandum from Gordan England, Sec’y of Navy, to the Sec’ys of the Military Dept’s et al., for Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba (July 7,
9
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This “representative” looked like a lawyer but in reality was a sort of
anti-lawyer with an obligation under the CSRT rules to turn over to
the tribunal any potentially inculpatory information the detainee
17
shared with him.
Luckily, the courts never permitted this sort of pervasive monitoring of habeas counsel. The converse, however—planting the idea
with clients that their lawyers were interrogators—has been and continues to be a problem. Whenever we visit the base, our clients are
told by the prison authorities that they have a “reservation”—the
same ambiguous term that is used when an interrogator has come to
18
visit. In this case, the military’s thinking seems to be that our clients
are more likely to voluntarily leave their cells for interrogations if
they think there is a chance that an attorney is actually waiting to
19
meet them. Understandably, the opposite form of confusion is the
more frequent effect: detainees stay in their cells, refusing to come
out, when their own lawyers are at the base to see them because they
mistakenly think that an interrogator will be waiting for them in the
20
meeting room.

2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
The CSRTs themselves were created to short-circuit the habeas review process, their
creators hoping that habeas courts would confine themselves to reviewing the record
created by these administrative “tribunals” under appropriately deferential standards
of review. See JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER 169–70 (2007).
17
Note that the current protective order contains an obligation to disclose threats
to national security or future immediate violence (as opposed to permission to disclose—which would be consistent with most professional norms governing attorneyclient confidentiality). See Protective Order and Procedures supra 7.
18
See Luban, supra note 1, at 1991.
19
This is in contrast to the commonplace earlier idea that the intrusion of lawyers would interfere with interrogations at Guantánamo. See MARGULIES, supra note
16, at 26–27.
20
Of course, the military has not been above fabricating claims that detainees
have refused visits. One client of ours was scheduled to see an attorney in early 2007
in connection with an urgent matter—the government’s attempt to transfer him to
Libya, where he feared being subjected to torture or worse. The military claimed he
refused his visit, but we later learned from a visit to another client in an adjacent cell
that in fact the first client was very eager to see his lawyers and tried to find out what
had gone wrong. See Luban, supra note 1, at 1990–91 (describing the incident in
some detail). Media pressure ultimately aborted the Libya transfer after the court
process had failed to do so. See Zalita v. Bush, No. 05-1220, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28951 (D.D.C. Apr. 19, 2007) (denying petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent his transfer to Libya), dismissed, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 9975 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 25, 2007), injunction denied, 550 U.S. 930 (2007), vacated and remanded, 554 U.S.
911 (2008). Both men have since been effectively granted asylum in safe third countries.
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These surveillance issues did not end with Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s
opinion allowing unmonitored attorney visits. After over a year of sitting on the story, the New York Times decided to publish an account of
the secret National Security Agency (NSA) warrantless surveillance
21
program instituted shortly after 9/11. It quickly became apparent
that the program had been directed at a category of communications
that would seem to overlap quite neatly with those in which habeas
counsel engage all the time: calls and emails where one end of the
line is in the United States and one end outside, and where one party
on the line is suspected of some link, however nebulous, to terrorism.
Our calls to family members of detainees, witnesses in the detainees’
cases, and perhaps even to co-counsel overseas (like Londoner Clive
Stafford-Smith of Reprieve), investigators, and foreign journalists,
might be subject to surveillance under the program, as might, latter22
ly, communications to released clients.
Given all of these intrusions on the presumptive confidentiality
of attorney-client communications, what, then, are habeas counsel’s
ethical obligations to clients or to other litigation participants with
whom they are communicating? The usual first-line response has
been to offer a disclaimer at the beginning of the conversation:
“Please understand that this conversation may be subject to illegal
monitoring and you should assume that anything you say may be
heard by the United States government” or a statement along those
lines. As a practical matter, this tends to confirm the already-existing
suspicion among Guantánamo detainees and their family members
that all American lawyers are suspect and possibly agents of the government—something encouraged by the military, which has had interrogators make false claims of being officials of the International
23
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), lawyers, doctors, etc.
Moreover, that sort of disclaimer presumes that the conversation
will touch on issues that are not serious enough to merit abstaining
21

James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
22
A FOIA request was duly made and litigated, with no results. Wilner v. Nat’l
Sec. Agency, No. 07 Civ. 3883, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48750, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. June 25,
2008), aff’d, 592 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 387 (2010). A suit seeking, inter alia, the same records for CCR attorneys was dismissed and is pending appeal. Order at 2, In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 3:06-md-1791
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 51, appeal pending . The case was originally filed as
Centre for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, Civ. No. 06-cv-313 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2006).
Thus, the question of whether this surveillance took place remains open.
23
See MARGULIES, supra note 16, at 133, 204, 215 (citing official reports of interrogators impersonating FBI and Department of State officials). Alternately, with a
sophisticated client the disclaimer can simply come off as trite.
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from communication in such an entirely unsecure format. For conversations during initial visits to Guantánamo, taken after long travel
and under extreme time pressure, there may be little choice, from a
practical perspective, whether or not to attempt to communicate
about important but sensitive subjects (e.g., “If the military decided
to let you go, would you feel safe returning to your home country?”).
For electronic communications with family members, witnesses, and
overseas counsel, however, other more secure but more expensive
options exist. In our litigation challenging the NSA program, CCR v.
Bush, we submitted declarations averring that legal staff at CCR had
changed their communications practices in response to the disclosure of the existence of the warrantless surveillance program, in some
cases deferring communications until in-person visits could take
place or using alternative means of communication more burden24
some than simply picking up the phone or writing an email. Our
ethics expert, Professor Stephen Gillers, opined that under certain
circumstances, attorneys faced with such a conundrum are obliged to
not use electronic means of communication at all (or for highly sensi25
tive communications at least).
Is there an equivalent circumstance for monitored visits? Might
there be conditions under which an attorney would be obligated to
forebear from even visiting a client? That is an ethical conundrum
more familiar to staffers of the ICRC than to American lawyers on
prison visits. The Red Cross, as a monitor-of-last-resort of humane
treatment standards for military detainees, has a different institutional ethos than a habeas attorney would; institutionally, its default position is that it is better to be present to try to ameliorate the worst
abuses, even when doing so risks lending legitimacy to horrific conditions (and, indeed, the representatives of the Red Cross may also end
up asking questions like our earlier example: “If the military decided
to let you go, would you feel safe returning to your home country?”).
The question of whether to participate in meetings with habeas
clients was not a close question for us, especially given our largely political approach to these cases. In general, CCR’s historical choice of
cases had been driven, in large part, by the notion that lawyers could
26
achieve “success without victory” —leveraging the litigation process
24
See Affirmation of William Goodman ¶ 15, CCR v. Bush, No. 06-cv-313
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2006), ECF No. 9.
25
Affirmation of Stephen Gillers ¶ 11, CCR v. Bush, No. 06-cv-313 (S.D.N.Y. Jun.
30, 2006), ECF No. 58.
26
Cf. JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG
ROAD TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA (2003).
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to produce justice through supporting and encouraging political activism, and triggering mass media coverage, rather than through victories in court that produce significant results or advance precedent
in useful ways. If one had gone into the post-Rasul litigation assuming that habeas courts would not ultimately be the quickest or most
likely venue to produce the desired result—release—then the most
sensible approach to early client meetings might well have been to
use those early conversations not to talk about anything related to
what the government alleged the detainees were doing prior to their
27
detention, but rather to focus exclusively on the abuses the detainees suffered in custody. This approach assumed that the political
and diplomatic fallout from the exposure of these abuses was most
likely to procure release by generating media attention that then resulted in pressure on the detainees’ home governments to use diplomatic sway to negotiate release of their nationals with the U.S. government. Of course, this only proves that the Rasul case, which went
to the Supreme Court in 2004, was in some ways an exception to the
“success without victory” theory: the largest anticipated gains were to
be made from gaining access to the clients, which required us to win
access in court. Winning on the merits in habeas, however, is a dif28
ferent matter.
We did, however, have more serious internal debates about
whether we should be involved in these cases and, most pointedly,
27
In general, the government facilitated this sort of forbearance by simply declining to tell us what our clients were accused of, making the tactical decision as to what
to talk about in those early meetings somewhat easier.
28
That is especially so given the current state of play in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, which has waged a campaign of resistance to the Boumediene decision worthy of Orval Faubus. Since Boumediene was decided in June 2008,
D.C. Circuit decisions have validated wholesale admission of hearsay and raw intelligence. Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al Odah v. United States, 611
F.3d 8, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The courts opened the door to reliance on the massaccuser allegations that are the government’s most frequent support in these cases;
they questioned the necessity of the preponderance standard of proof, see Al-Bihani
v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2010), suggested “some evidence” ought
to be the applicable standard, see Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (Silberman, C.J., concurring), used a novel theory of “conditional probability”
to overturn a district court’s habeas grant predicated on the factual credibility of the
detainee’s own testimony, Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105–06 (D.C. Cir.
2010), and opined that evidence supporting the government’s “reasonable belief”
that a detainee had ever “visited Al Qaeda guesthouses” or attended a training camp
“would seem to overwhelmingly, if not definitively” justify detention, Al-Bihani, 590
F.3d at 873 n.2. See also Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Meanwhile, the district courts have decided that nearly all cases for detainees cleared
by President Obama’s Guantánamo Review Task Force should be stayed. We cannot,
however, cite any such decision because the fact that the petitioner in any particular
case is cleared for release is deemed “protected information.”
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over the question of whether we should participate in the military
commission system under which many of our initial habeas clients
were charged. Ultimately, the first round of the commissions never
got very far, thanks to the Hamdan litigation, which resulted in the
complete restructuring of the commissions in the Military Commis29
sions Act of 2006 (MCA). But the question of whether we should
participate has occurred recently as well, because of special rules of
access applied to the so-called high-value detainees (HVDs). That
term—a euphemism for former CIA detainees held in black sites—
refers to the fourteen men brought to Guantánamo in September of
2006, in the wake of the Hamdan decision, in order to provoke Con30
gress to pass the MCA. Our client, Majid Khan, was the first to be
visited by habeas counsel in late 2007. That visit was the culmination
31
of months of negotiations over conditions of access, which were and
are much more stringent than those for other Guantánamo detainees. HVD counsel have been forced to get a higher level of security
clearance—sufficient to allow us to be exposed to Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI)—and agree to
prepublication review of writings that might touch upon such infor32
mation. That is the same sort of arrangement that CIA agents enter
into before starting their jobs, but here again the government’s main
concern is not that we will somehow be exposed to information
29
Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–50w
(2006) and in other scattered sections of 10 and 18 U.S.C.).
30
See Jonathan Karl, High Value Detainees Transferred to Guantanamo, ABC NEWS
(Sept. 6, 2006), http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=2400470.
31
The government refused for many months to allow Khan to be visited by opposing his attorneys’ motion for entry of the standard protective order—citing to the
MCA’s purported strip of habeas jurisdiction and ostensibly differentiating this case
from others on the grounds that any protective order governing the former-CIAdetainee cases should be developed in the (government-friendly) confines of the
D.C. Circuit, which would eventually have jurisdiction under the then-valid provisions for review in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. See Respondents’ Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion for Emergency Access to Counsel and Entry of Amended Protective Order at 8–22, Khan v. Bush, No. 06-cv-1690-RBW (D.D.C.
Oct. 26, 2006), ECF No. 6.
32
This obviously limits the sort of media-centric litigation strategy that counsel
might otherwise be inclined to adopt. The special “SCI Protective Order” for the
HVD cases also contains a provision that allows the government to take “unilateral”
action to safeguard classified information if it—not the court—concludes that a
breach of the protective order has taken place. See Proposed Protective Order, Exhibit A to Emergency Stipulation to Immediate Entry of Interim Guantanamo SCI Protective Order ¶ 9.B, Khan v. Gates, No. 07-1324 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 12, 2007) (“The USG
reserves the right to unilateral [sic] take protective measures to safeguard classified
information if it concludes that any provision of the protective order has been violated and the result of such violation reasonably could be expect to lead to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.”).
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created by the government that is classified TS/SCI. Instead, we are
once again speaking almost exclusively of information stored in the
detainees’ brains. In particular, as the government’s public briefing
33
in these cases demonstrates, knowledge of the enhanced interrogation techniques used against certain detainees is not just classified but
TS/SCI classified, even though the government has, by definition,
disclosed it to the detainees in the course of using those techniques
on them. In other words, for these clients, information stuck in their
heads is classified as capable of causing “exceptionally grave damage
34
to the national security” (the definition of TS/SCI information).
The ramifications are clear to all observers: as Marty Lederman noted
at the time, such a system presumes that these clients can never be—
35
and will never be—released.
Post-Boumediene, these ground rules were further elaborated
upon with the negotiation of a special protective order for all the
HVD cases. Under the standard protective order, counsel in all cases
are presumed to have a “need to know” the classified information
produced to counsel in other habeas cases, and therefore can share it
with each other subject to the usual strictures for handling classified
information—which is to say, such sharing generally happens only in
36
the confines of the Secure Facility. This has proved inordinately
useful, in particular, when one detainee has given witness against
another. However, habeas counsel for HVDs cannot share information with habeas counsel for other HVDs without requesting that the
government approve specific requests for sharing on a need-to-know
37
basis. In other words, we are, under this protective order, forced to
notify our adversaries of our desire to share specific items of informa-

33
See Respondents’ Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 31, at 3–4 (“For example, information such as where detainees have been held, the details of their confinement, interrogation methods, and other operational details constitute or involve
TOP SECRET//SCI information.”).
34
See Exec. Order No. 13,292 § 1.2(a)(1), 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003).
35
Marty Lederman, You Call It “Torture”; We Call It “Coming into Possession of Classified Information,”
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 4, 2006, 2:54 PM), http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2006/11/you-call-it-torture-we-call-it-coming.html.
36
See Protective Order and Procedures, supra note 7, at 163. There are very limited, enumerated exceptions to the “need to know” presumption described in the
text. Id.
37
See, e.g., Protective Order for Habeas Cases Involving TOP
SECRET / SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION and Procedures for
Counsel Access to Detainees at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, in Habeas Cases Involving TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED
INFORMATION at pt. I, ¶ 29, Khan v. Bush, No. 06-cv-1690 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 2009),
ECF No. 118.
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tion between specific cases, and then gain their permission before
doing so. That is a situation in some ways reminiscent of the feature
of the military commission system whereby the defendant’s adversary—the government—has to approve specific funding requests by
the defendant’s lawyers with the Office of the Military CommissionsDefense (OMC-D), except that the HVD rule on sharing information
creates a more obvious risk of implicit disclosure of litigation strate38
gy.
Even when lawyers’ participation in a skewed process is both ethical and beneficial for their clients, client trust is at stake in our willingness to push to the edge of what is permissible under such restric39
tive rules. Take, for example, the issue of legal mail. Legal mail is
defined in the standard protective order as correspondence “related
to counsel’s representation of the detainee;” only such mail can be
40
delivered as privileged. Now, are news stories ever “related to counsel’s representation of the detainee”? What if they disclose political
conditions in the client’s home country, a place to which he fears returning and where judgment of the current balance of power is essential to evaluating such torture fears? What about political news
from the United States? Surely, that might affect the outcome of
these most highly politicized cases. What about diplomatic news from
third countries that might offer resettlement to unfortunates like the
Uighurs? All of this, in our view, is relevant to settlement—possible
settlement being a part of every case by definition—but different law41
yers have tended to draw the line in different places. And with
hundreds of lawyers representing hundreds of detainees, the conditions are ideal for generating a sort of contest between lawyers—
officiated by the detainees—regarding how far each individual lawyer
is willing to push the system: one detainee’s lawyer brings some news
38
They also had to be approved by the chief defense counsel, raising hazards of
indirect disclosure of “confidential information [to] clients with adverse interests.”
Luban, supra note 1, at 2007.
39
Professor Luban’s article contains an extended discussion of other aspects of
the trust deficit habeas counsel have struggled against with detainees. See id. at 1991–
98.
40
See Protective Order and Procedures, supra note 7, at 156.
41
For perspective—in case this sort of self-censorship seems overcautious—it is
worth knowing that lawyers were initially blocked from bringing copies of the Supreme Court’s Hamdan decision into meetings at the base on September 12, 2006, a
few months after the decision was rendered. Though that issue was eventually resolved, other documents explaining the decision were not allowed in during base visits. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & REPRIEVE, CONTINUED GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS
TO INTERFERE WITH THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF DETAINEES AT GUANTÁNAMO BAY,
CUBA 9 (2007) (on file with author).
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from the home country, another detainee’s lawyer does not, and
suddenly, one detainee is less content with his representation. This
effect has been noted in many other discussions of lawyering at Guantánamo: extreme isolation and incommunicado detention, combined
with these rules limiting access to basic outside news, means that the
detainees are left with nothing extrinsic to allow them to figure out
whether to trust their lawyers. Indeed, one major early victory was
the inclusion of a provision in the protective order that allowed the
bringing of introductory materials from the detainees’ families on the
outside into initial meetings, as a means for confirming identity and
building trust. Often, especially in the first year of the litigation after
Rasul in the district courts, counsel would try to first visit family and
only then head to Guantánamo, in order to be able to bring videos or
42
letters from close relatives into the initial meetings.
One can imagine that this sort of game of playing habeas lawyers
against each other becomes worse when the information a lawyer
would like to share with her client is not a trivial news story but rather
involves evidence against the detainee that a lawyer is foreclosed by
43
the rules from sharing. Such a situation arose in one of our cases,
which ended happily with the client’s release. This client, a Mr. B.,
had the typical jumble of mutually incoherent allegations against
him. But there was one very damning classified allegation about him
that we wanted to make sure he responded to. The allegation itself
took up about four lines in one document, apparently relating to the
interrogation of another detainee. It should have been very easy for
Mr. B. to refute this allegation based on its content. That one vital
document, however, was ninety-five percent redacted—including the

42

See Protective Order and Procedures, supra note 7, at 161–62.
[T]he Commander, JTF-Guantanamo . . . shall not unreasonably withhold approval for counsel to bring into a meeting with a detainee letters, tapes, or other communications introducing counsel to the detainee, if the government has first reviewed the communication and
determined that sharing the communication with the detainee would
not threaten the security of the United States.
Id. This provision was added to the amended Counsel Access Procedures approved
by Judge Green in November 2004. See Exhibit A to Amended Protective Order and
Procedures for Counsel Access at 6, Al Odah v. United States, No. 02-cv-828 (D.D.C.
Nov. 8, 2004), ECF No. 141; cf. Exhibit A to Notice of Supplemental Counsel Access
Procedures, Al Odah v. United States, No. 02-cv-828 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2004), ECF No.
97.
43
The text discusses a situation where the evidence was from another person accusing our client, but even more problematic is the frequent situation in which the
“classified” evidence is something that the client purportedly said himself. Cf. supra
note 10.
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identity of the accuser—even though two of Mr. B.’s three habeas
44
counsel had not just SECRET level but TS/SCI clearances.
The government agreed to process the relevant part of this document for possible declassification, and we scheduled a two-day trip
to meet with Mr. B. to discuss its contents. We told him we were coming specifically to discuss important allegations, based on assurances
from the Justice Department that we would get the documents in
time. On the first day of our trip, counsel arrived to find that no
cleared documents were waiting. Our attorney spent a very long day
meeting with a very frustrated Mr. B. That evening at the base, we received a copy of the four lines, newly cleared for disclosure to our
45
client. But the next day, Mr. B. refused to come out to meet with us.
Per the usual procedures, we were allowed to write him a note. Typically, these refusal notes (which would probably, if the hundreds of
them written at Guantánamo were bound together, make for a fine
book) simply note that lawyers and not interrogators are here to visit
during the “reservation.” That is usually enough to bring the detainees out of their cells. In this case, Mr. B. wrote us a very polite note
back, saying, in so many words, “I don’t blame you, but the system of
which you are a part, in which you are participating, is a joke, and I’m
46
not playing along anymore.”
44
Bear in mind that “declassified” does not mean “unprotected”—the government might decide that even unclassified materials are not suitable for public filing
(in which case it may seek to designate those parts of the unclassified materials as
“protected” under the terms of the governing Protective Order), and the government has not yet filed a fully public version of Mr. B.’s factual return, even though
Mr. B. is back in his own home, free, and working towards his master’s degree.
45
While the timing of the delays here was particularly frustrating, issues with leisurely or recalcitrant classification review were consistently problematic in the early
days of the habeas litigation. While the original protective order provided for review
of English submissions in seven days and non-English ones in fourteen, the government incredibly claimed in one incident in November 2005 that it lacked access to
an Arabic translator and advised that counsel should resort to the court for classification review. See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & REPRIEVE, supra note 41, at 10. A
year later, in another case, when counsel did seek help from the district court, the
court found that the government violated the protective order by failing to process
the documents in question. See Order at 4–5, Al-Anazi v. Bush, No. 05-cv-345 (D.D.C.
Sept. 25, 2006), ECF No. 71 (“[T]he PRT may not simply refuse to conduct a classification review of documents submitted to it by habeas counsel as a self-help mechanism . . . furthermore, the Protective Order clearly requires the PRT to conduct a classification review of any information submitted to it within very defined timeframes.”).
46
His exact words:
First, please know that I am not upset with you or upset about what
happened, but this is the choice that I have chosen for myself. After
lengthy reflection, I have concluded that from the government, there is
no justice to be hoped for, however much you try. You have seen your-
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Mr. B. was eventually cleared and sent back home to his war-torn
home country, from which he had fled decades ago as a refugee before being scooped up and handed to the Americans. The government only cleared him after we filed an extensive Motion for Judgment on the Record (the rough equivalent to summary judgment in
these cases), spending six weeks of attorney time in the miserably
cold Secure Facility drafting it, with a hearing on the near horizon.
As of the writing of this piece, the government is fighting Mr. B.’s
ability to litigate his habeas case, post-release, to resolution so that he
can get his life back and maybe leave his country again for a better
life.
Mr. B.’s case illustrates many elements of ethically questionable
government conduct common to this litigation: withholding exculpatory evidence, refusing to allow exposure of bogus inculpatory evidence to scrutiny that could make it evaporate, and preventing a merits disposition by gamesmanship after extracting the maximum of
effort from the lawyers on the opposite side. That is, of course,
putting to one side the less sophisticated attempts to drive a wedge
between lawyers and clients—the well-documented efforts by the Department of Defense to get habeas law firms’ corporate clients to
47
boycott the firms and to convince detainees that their lawyers were
48
gay, Jewish, and/or working for Israel on the side. These policies
were designed to ensure that detainees had a disincentive to meet
with lawyers—for instance, transferring detainees to solitary confinement huts in Camp Echo used for attorney-client meetings for as
49
much as eleven days prior to the meeting, gradually imposing see-

47
48
49

self how the government balances are flawed. Those who were captured in the battlefield are released, while those who were abducted
from their homes languish in prison without a reason except that they
have no government demanding to have them or that they do not belong to a country that is esteemed by the U.S.A. Please convey my salutations to [my father].—[Signed, B].
See Luban, supra note 1, at 1981–83.
See id. at 1994–96.
See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & REPRIEVE, supra note 41, at 7–8.
When lawyers were first allowed on the base, prisoners were forced to
sit in isolation in Camp Echo for as long as eleven days prior to a legal
visit . . . and have been held an equal time afterwards. Jamal Kiyemba,
a British resident, was held in isolation for ten days before his lawyer’s
visit. He wrote: “Camp Echo is the most lonely place on earth. I was all
alone for ten days. They brought me over here, they would not let me
take my Qur’an, and they put me in an isolation cell with nothing.
There is no way to talk to any other prisoner, you’re not meant to talk
to the guards. There is a camera and microphones in the cell to make
sure this is obeyed. . . . If I complain about Camp Echo, I am told that

KADIDAL_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/22/2011 9:10 AM

1410

[Vol. 41:1397

CONFRONTING ETHICAL ISSUES

mingly arbitrary policies that have reduced the total amount of visit
time available in a week at the base from sixty-three working hours
50
per seven day week to thirty hours, and allowing horrendous delays
51
in the processing and delivery of legal correspondence.
These crude efforts were matched by more sophisticated ones
during the absolute nadir of post-Rasul attorney access, in the wake of
the passage of the MCA. In early 2007, the government argued that a
new, much more restrictive protective order should be adopted in
order to protect the security of sensitive information, including, of
52
course, the clients’ own statements to their lawyers. The issue of the
it is the lawyer’s fault. If I did not have to come for a legal visit, I would
not be treated like this.”. . . One detainee . . . was forced to wake up at
three in the morning in order to be taken forty yards across the street
for a legal visit that did not begin until 9am. Another . . . wrote to his
lawyer that he is sometimes forced to “spend two days in solitary for
you, sometimes a week.”
Id.
50
See id. at 9 (noting that originally attorneys were permitted to visit clients seven
days a week for the full time from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. without any mandated
break, but that, currently, that has been reduced to approximately five hours per day
because the visit day now runs from approximately 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. with a
mandatory lunch break lasting about one and a half hours—though with permission,
sessions can be extended through lunch and an hour or so into the evening, at the
complete discretion of Guantánamo authorities—and with weekday-only visits the
norm except in exceptional circumstances). The current situation represents some
improvement (especially in terms of the discretion outline above) over the situation
at its nadir in the wake of the passage of the MCA: “Indeed, in letters of complaint to
the government, attorneys have detailed being allowed as few as eighteen hours with
clients in an entire week, in early 2007.” Id.
51
See id.
Legal mail sent to the detainee is required to be delivered to the detainee within two business days of its clearance [by the Privilege Review
Team]; legal mail sent by the detainee must be collected within one
business day and must then be sent to the appropriate address within
two business days after its collection. There have, however, been numerous instances in which legal mail has either been lost or substantially delayed. One attorney testified to Congress that he has been in
Guantánamo when legal mail has arrived for his clients five or six weeks
after it was sent; and that legal mail from his clients has arrived weeks
or months later, and sometimes not at all.
Id.(footnotes omitted) (citing Subcomm. on Def. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations,
110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Thomas Wilner, Attorney, Guantánamo Detainees)).
52
The government sought to make all access subject to the terms of the protective order it had previously sought in the context of the first petitions for review under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. See Motion for Entry of Protective Order at
13–14, Bismullah v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-1197 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 2006) (DTA petition
for review)
[B]ecause review under the DTA is on the record of the CSRT, counsel
does not have a need to engage in factual development or unlimited
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53

new protective order was argued on May 15, 2007. Surely by coincidence, on May 21, 2007, one week later, the Defense Department announced that, pursuant to a FOIA request by undisclosed parties, it
was planning to release materials concerning “alleged violations by
54
habeas counsel of the protective order.” The government released
only selected correspondence about the supposed violations; it never
released the dispositions (formal or informal, administrative or otherwise) of its allegations and never once sought sanctions from a
court or revoked an attorney’s security clearance, despite the fact that
clearance status is, for all practical purposes, is in its unfettered discretion. The implications of such mudslinging go far beyond the
confines of the curious legal black hole that is Guantánamo, for even
the most trivial violations of protective orders reflect on the issue of
whether adversary attorneys should be trusted to play any role in a
process of judicial review for military detainees, or, more broadly, for
terrorism suspects wherever they may be held. Each such attempt, in
the wake of ever-broader jurisdiction-stripping efforts by the governconsultation with the detainee. We understand, however, that some
consultation may be useful in preparing the detainee’s DTA case and
could assist this Court in its record review function. Thus the proposed
order allows such consultation. . . . [However,] it must be remembered
that there is no right to counsel in this context and there is no tradition of attorney client privilege.
Id. “The government is in no way conceding that the detainees . . . have a right to
counsel or that their counsel have a legal right to view classified materials” submitted
by the government in these cases. Id. at 12–13. “[T]he order precludes the sharing
of classified material between private counsel [with security clearances] for different
petitioners who are involved in different detainee cases.” Id. at 10.
53
See Brief of Respondent in Opposition to the Petitions for Rehearing at 5,
Boumediene v. Bush, 551 U.S. 1160 (2007)(No. 06-1195).
54
See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & REPRIEVE, supra note 41, at 2 n.3 (quoting DoD notice to counsel).
I am writing to inform you, as a courtesy, that certain correspondence
between you and the Department of Justice in the context of the Guantanamo habeas litigation will be released by the Department this week
in its response to a Freedom of Information request seeking documents relating to alleged violations by habeas counsel of the protective
order entered in many of the Guantanamo district court habeas cases.
Please be aware that the Department’s response will also include any
correspondence from you responding to allegations of a violation of
the protective order. Also, to the extent it may have been included in
the correspondence, personal information, specifically cell phone
numbers and home addresses (as opposed to business contact information), will be redacted from the materials and not disclosed. Similarly,
to the extent they are included in the correspondence, names of Guantanamo personnel not otherwise made public by the government will
be redacted from the materials and not disclosed.
Id.
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ment, carried the implicit threat of resort to Congress to remove
access to our clients entirely. Ultimately the original protective order
created after Rasul by Judge Green has, with slight modification, governed attorney-detainee contact after Boumediene.
At the same time, the government began aggressively denying
additional clearances to firms and organizations representing groups
of detainees. For instance, I took over as head of CCR’s Guantánamo
project in late December 2006, but the Justice Department refused to
allow me to submit my clearance application—that is, it refused to
process my clearance application. The justification offered was that,
at the time, CCR already had two cleared attorneys, and, in the wake
of the MCA, there was next to nothing left to litigate, so additional
clearances were unnecessary and would simply widen the pool of individuals with access to the classified materials in these cases. The
Justice Department contended that this would increase the risk of accidental or negligent disclosures and the burden on the government
of processing the applications. Although my clearance was ultimately
processed by January 2008 in connection with the disputes described
55
above in the Khan case, the government maintained its parsimonious attitude towards clearances until Boumediene was decided, at
which time the government’s practice became somewhat liberalized.
In the interim, of course, this posed a great burden to many law firms
as their associates often carried the bulk of the onerous travelrequiring duties of visiting the base and working with the factual materials in the Secure Facility.
Also worth noting are the varied forms in which the government
has violated the no-contact rule: (1) FBI clean teams re-interviewed
56
numerous tortured detainees from 2007 to 2008; (2) officials held
one detainee for five extra months after his clearance for transfer because the government was busily negotiating his immunity in exchange for testimony in Salim Hamdan’s military commission—all
57
without informing his habeas counsel; and (3) in August 2010, a
Staff Judge Advocate (a military lawyer) went into the cell of a client
who hung up during a phone call with counsel to ask him if he “still”
58
wanted to “fire his lawyer and withdraw his case.”

55

See supra note 31.
See Luban, supra note 1, at 2023 (citing Josh White, Dan Eggen & Joby Warrick,
U.S. to Try 6 on Capital Charges Over 9/11 Attacks, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2008, at A1
(government confirming detainee and attorney accounts)).
57
See id. at 2023–24.
58
Status Report of Respondents in Advance of Status Conference, at ex. A, Decl.
of Capt. Don A. Martin ¶ 12, Al-Qahtani v. Obama, No. 05-cv-1971 (D.D.C. Sep. 16,
56
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These examples illustrate the central ethical failing that has characterized these cases: the government has gamed the process to
maximize the burden of litigation on its opponents and to delay reso59
lution on the merits in court, all of which is contrary to the basic notion that the adversary system only works in the way intended if both
60
sides agree to fight hard, but fight toward a just resolution in court,
and not seek to win by increasing or leveraging transaction costs.
The response, ironically, of habeas counsel to this grinding delay
and gamesmanship has been, in a sense, to game the system themselves, generally focusing efforts on airing out information from the
black box that was pre-Rasul Guantánamo. Faced with a heavily resourced adversary willing to expend its vast storehouse of credibility
with the courts in an effort to delay a day of reckoning on the merits,
habeas lawyers responded rationally: they attempted to resolve cases
through public political forums, both here at home and, perhaps
61
more effectively in the years prior to 2005, overseas.
It is quite a stretch to call that gamesmanship, but doing so
would of course assume that the ground rules of the existing process
62
are fair, such that systematic criticism would not be in order. Many
of the men at Guantánamo have responded to the roller coaster of
nine years of litigation, punctuated by frequent farcical events, by refusing to participate. At times, defense counsel have done so as well
or have participated while risking their employment as defense counsel in an effort to criticize the whole system. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers issued guidance stating that it
would be an ethical violation for attorneys to work on the defense of
63
detainees in the original military commissions. Military lawyer Dan

2010), ECF No. 224; cf. Transcript of Status Conference at 6–8, Al-Qahtani v. Obama,
No. 05-cv-1971 (D.D.C. Sep. 17, 2010) (Judge Collyer requesting DOJ to enforce the
no-contact rule and asking DOJ to warn the staff judge advocates at the base to avoid
future violations).
59
Despite the typically marginal nature of the cases going forward (as almost
every case for a cleared detainee is stayed), the record of detainees in the district
courts stands at thirty-seven wins and twenty losses. Guantanamo Bay Habeas Decision
Scorecard, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., http://ccrjustice.org/GTMOscorecard (last visited
Sept. 20, 2011); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
60
I would include just settlements in the category of cases resolved through resort
to the courts; thus, many cases where justice was served through release would be included.
61
See supra text accompanying note 27.
62
See Luban, supra note 1, at 2002–06 (exploring the conflict between fundamental military norms of loyalty to government and the hierarchy and legitimate criticism
of military commission process).
63
See id. at 2019 n.176.
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Mori made such frequent and insistent criticisms of the “kangaroo
court”—the first military commission system—in his client David
Hicks’ home country of Australia that the military prosecutors threat64
ened to court-martial him. Of course, many others on the prosecutorial side of the commissions chose to resign rather than take part in
the proceedings: Stuart Couch, who refused to prosecute Mohammedou Slahi because he had been subjected to torture; Darrel J. Vandeveld, who resigned from the commission prosecution of Afghan juvenile Mohammed Jawad; Major Robert Preston, Major John Carr, and
Captain Carrie Wolf, who requested reassignment from the preHamdan/pre-MCA commissions because they were designed to ensure no acquittals; and Col. Morris Davis, who quit as Chief Prosecu65
tor in October 2007.
***
One set of issues rarely discussed, but always lurking in the background in the early days of the litigation, concerns the material sup66
port statute.
Under that statute and similar sanctions regimes
created by regulation under the International Emergency Economic
67
Powers Act (IEEPA), the government creates blacklists of designated
terrorist organizations, at which point nearly any form of association
68
with agents of a blacklisted group—providing “training,” “expert ad64

See id. at 2015–16.
Mori, who was in Australia investigating the case, delivered a number of
blistering public comments against the military commissions, charging
that they are rigged for conviction. . . . As a result, Colonel Davis suggested that Mori might be court-martialed for violating a military law
prohibition on speaking disrespectfully of high U.S. government officials.
Id. “The important documents in this incident—including news stories and e-mail
messages from Col. Davis—may be found as attachments to the defense’s motion to
disqualify Col. Davis.” Id. at 2016 n.157.
65
See, e.g., Jesse Bravin, The Conscience of the Colonel, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2007, A1.
66
18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006). For an early general discussion, see Shayana Kadidal, Public Interest Lawyering: “Material Support” of Terrorism?, JURIST (May 6, 2010),
http://jurist.org/forum/2010/05/public-interest-lawyering-material-support-ofterrorism.php.
67
50 U.S.C. § 1705(b) (2006).
68
Our office’s correspondence regarding licensing questions indicates that the
government’s working definition of “agent” of a designated organization to be “persons or entities owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of a designated terrorist
organization, regardless of whether or not they appear on the [master] SDN [Specially Designated Nationals] List.” Letter from Andrea Gacki, Assistant Dir. for Licensing, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, to Ctr. for Constitutional Rights (Mar. 10, 2010)
(on file with author). Regulations under Part 597 purport to define “agent” in the
same manner as above, but the regulations themselves disclaim placing any limitation on the scope of the statute. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 597.101, 597.301 (2011); Global
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vice and assistance,” “personnel” (whether yourself or through other
individuals), or “services”—becomes a federal felony. The material
support statute is the statute under which attorney Lynne Stewart was
69
prosecuted and convicted in February 2005. Stewart was convicted
for essentially providing her detained client with a window to communicate with his followers on the outside; thus, she became “per70
sonnel” to her client’s blacklisted organization. At an early day-long
training session for habeas counsel just after the conviction, the initial questions from the audience of prospective habeas counsel all
concerned the case and its ramifications for attorneys venturing into
this strange new world of the habeas protective order. Easy parallels
to Stewart’s case may be found in some of the restrictions on disseminating information from the mouths of detainees described
71
above. The provision of “services,” however, presents a much more
troubling question.
The government has always interpreted “services” to include “legal services,” and when the scope of the statute was tested against a

Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, id. § 595.408(a) (purporting to prohibit charitable
contributions to an entity or individual—whether designated or not—“acting for or
on behalf of, or owned or controlled by, a specially designated terrorist.”); see also id.
§ 595.408(b) (“Individuals and organizations who donate or contribute funds, goods,
services or technology without knowledge or reason to know that the donation or
contribution is destined to or for the benefit of a specially designated terrorist shall
not be subject to penalties for such donation or contribution.”); cf. United States v.
Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
In contrast, appellants in the Holy Land Foundation criminal appeals noted,
“E.O. 12947—the source of authority for the regulation—contemplates that such
entities will themselves be designated and placed on the Treasury Department list.”
Opening Brief of Appellant Ghassan Elashi (with Common Issues) at 81 n.41, United
States v. El-Mezain, No. 09-10560 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/40448532/Ghassan-Elashi-appeal.
69
See United States v. Sattar, 395 F. Supp. 2d 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
70
United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 114 (2d Cir. 2009).
71
Indeed, obedience to restrictions on information dissemination from a detainee, Omar Abdel Rahman, was central to the government’s case against Stewart. See
Interview by Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez with Michael Tigar, Professor of the
Practice of Law, Emeritus, Duke Law Sch., Attorney to Lynne Stewart (Feb. 11, 2005),
available at http://www.democracynow.org/2005/2/11/convicted_attorney_lynne
_stewart_you_cant.
The only way that we will ever get to the bottom of the American concentration camp abuses at Gitmo and Abu Ghraib is that if the lawyers
for these prisoners are permitted to tell their stories to the world. If
the government can shut off that communication, which they have attempted to do over and over and over again, these activities will continue in secret . . . .
Id.
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72

First Amendment challenge in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
the government defended that interpretation against several rounds
73
of pointed questioning from the judges. But what about merely
forming an attorney-client relationship? Can an attorney be retained
74
to provide pro bono legal services for someone accused of being an
agent of a blacklisted organization—such as Al Qaeda or the Tali75
ban, groups essentially every Guantánamo detainee is alleged to
have been associated with—without falling afoul of the material support statute and similar terrorism sanctions regimes?
72
130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). In Humanitarian Law Project, plaintiffs, who were various aid and human rights groups, sought to provide training and political advocacy
for two banned groups. Id. at 2713. The Court agreed with the plaintiffs that such
proposed “material support” was speech, but then upheld the statute’s restriction on
that speech in the face of heightened scrutiny. Id. at 2723. The case thus marks the
only standing precedent in the history of the Court to uphold a content-based
speech restriction. The only previous such precedent, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), was overturned by Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). The polling-place pamphleting restriction case
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), is often mistakenly cited as upholding a content-based restriction, but it was ultimately decided on the basis of Justice Scalia’s
fifth vote, which was predicated on the fact that sidewalks around a polling place
were not by tradition a public forum. Id. at 214–17 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
73
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49–53, Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498 / 09-89) (“Justice Breyer: ‘I want to
know if that’s what you’re saying . . . an organization has American citizens, engages
in terrible stuff, but they are not entitled under the Constitution to have a lawyer in
the United States who does legal work like filing amicus briefs.’ . . . Justice Kennedy:
‘[Is one permitted to say:] here’s how to file an amicus brief?’ Solicitor General Kagan: ‘. . . you can’t.’”).
74
Whether an attorney can be paid by the blacklisted party for doing such work
is a separate and more difficult question. The government has always asserted that it
can cut off blocked funds from being used to pay attorneys under international sanctions regimes. Compare Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 875 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (“[N]othing in our disposition is properly read as authorizing payment to
counsel without the approval of OFAC.”), with infra text accompanying note 91 (describing 75 Fed. Reg. 75,904, which permits lawyers to receive payment in certain
carefully circumscribed circumstances).
75
Note that Al Qaeda is on the Foreign Terrorist Organization list of groups to
which support is banned by the material support statute, but the Taliban is not. ForDEP’T
STATE
(Sept.
15,
2011),
eign
Terrorist
Organizations,
U.S.
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. It is instead designated under a different sanctions scheme—created by executive order pursuant to the
IEEPA—the GTSR, as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” (SDGT). Oddly, the
“Pakistani Taliban” and the “Kurdish Taliban” are each on both lists. Id. For a “master list” of individuals and organizations designated under various similarly designed
sanctions schemes, see Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN), U.S. DEP’T THE
TREASURY, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn (last updated Sept.
29, 2011). For a description of the various schemes, see Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., http://ccrjustice.org/hlp (last visited Sept. 27, 2011).
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At oral argument, then-Solicitor General and current Justice
Elena Kagan offered a safe harbor: if there was a constitutional right
capable of vindication in the courts (e.g., Sixth Amendment criminal
76
process rights for an individual facing charges, a Fifth Amendment
interest in seized property, or a Suspension Clause or due process interest in habeas), “then the government believes that the statute
should be read so as not to include that” in the scope of what is cri77
minally prohibited. That position is also consistent with the one decision addressing this issue in any detail—American Airways Charters,
78
Inc. v. Regan, authored by Justice Ginsburg when she was a judge on
the D.C. Circuit.
That “constitutional right” safe harbor is, of course, small comfort to the public interest and pro bono attorneys who represented
79
80
Guantánamo detainees—some for pay —over the last nine years.

76

When commentators such as Marc Thiessen state so vehemently that detainees,
such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, have no Sixth Amendment rights, perhaps part
of what they are trying to state is that attorneys should not feel free to represent them
without the government’s consent. See Marc Thiessen, The “Al-Qaeda Seven” Aren’t
Like John Adams, WASH. POST POSTPARTISAN BLOG (Mar. 11, 2010, 11:06 AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2010/03/the_alqaeda_seven_arent_like_john.html. Note that the original (2006) MCA allowed
some degree of vetting control by the government of civilian defense counsel beyond
that implicit in the granting of clearances. See Military Commissions Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 948k(b)(2), 949c(b)(3), 950h(c), 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in
scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
77
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 73, at 49–50.
78
746 F.2d 865, 871–73 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that, at least in the absence of
clear statement of congressional intent, it would be inconsistent with due process to
interpret the statute as permitting the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) to
ban formation of attorney-client relationship). This opinion concerned whether a
lawyer could represent an entity that was targeted under the Cuban economic embargo regulations, which bar most transactions, whether they involve money or not,
between Cuban nationals and Americans. Id. at 867–69. The government may ban
payments to the lawyer and in fact the Cuban government’s lawyers in the United
States seek annual licenses to get paid for their work. See id. at 872. But on the question of whether the lawyer could form an attorney-client relationship with his blacklisted client—that is, whether he could represent them at all, even pro bono—the
court only offered this small comfort: where the Due Process Clause of the Constitution guaranteed some rights enforceable in court to the client, then the lawyer could
provide his legal “services” for free without fear of criminal prosecution. See id. at
873.
79
The Kuwaiti government initially retained Shearman & Sterling to represent all
twelve of its nationals at Guantánamo, though the proceeds were donated to a nonprofit group. See Debra Cassens Weiss, For Three Law Firms, Gitmo Cases Weren’t Strictly
Pro Bono, ABA J. (July 29, 2008),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/for_three_law_firms_gitmo_cases_werent_strictly_pro_bono. Of course, that
is not to diminish the firm’s political courage in taking on these cases, which has
been tested and validated time and again since early 2002.
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Even the Bush administration’s Justice Department declined to focus
on this question of whether lawyers had the right to represent clients
without criminal liability. The administration, however, has consistently claimed that Rasul v. Bush did not establish any constitutional
right to habeas. The government argued and continues to argue that
Rasul only established a statutory right and that it was only with 2008’s
Boumediene decision that a constitutional right to habeas was estab81
lished.

80
It remains an uncertainty whether or how far former Solicitor General Kagan’s
concession also applies to non-litigation advocacy connected to issues at stake in individual litigation cases. One can imagine that for advocacy directed at the cases as a
group, the exception the Supreme Court recognized for “independent advocacy”
would generally apply. To the extent that much of the initial non-litigation / media
advocacy was carried out overseas, that would seem to make little difference on the
face of the statute. The statute’s text claims that it applies to any individual whose
transactions, presumably in the goods or services that are subject to the violation,
have any effect on domestic or foreign commerce, or persons aiding / abetting / conspiring with the above, as well as persons who later enter the
United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(1)(c) (2006). It is also unclear to what extent various marginal examples literally fitting the above criteria would meet Due
Process nexus and notice requirements.
Note also that the initial habeas petitions included a number of statutory claims,
including, for example, claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for violations of
international law (e.g. norms against torture and arbitrary detention) and treaties
(including the Geneva Conventions) in tort. See, e.g., Petition for Habeas Corpus and
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Ameziane v. Bush, No. 05-392
(D.D.C. Feb. 24, 2005), ECF # 1, Claims 5–9 (ATS); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Rasul v. Bush, No. 02-299 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2002), ECF # 1, Claims 3–4 (international law). Though the ATS—reading “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)—is usually
thought of as a vehicle for damages claims in tort, tort claims under ATS can presumably be remedied by injunction. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ.1163
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2000) (enjoining defendant and his forces from various actions in
furtherance of genocide); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F.
Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990) (default judgment against the Soviet Union, granting injunctive, declaratory, and compensatory relief under the ATS, and ordering the Russian government to release a
political prisoner or otherwise account for his whereabouts); cf. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama,
727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 40–44 (D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting ATS claims because court found
no cognizable international law tort and declined to waive sovereign immunity, but
not questioning concept of injunctive relief under ATS generally). Would claims
brought under these non-constitutional provisions be subject to sanctions for providing material support, on the theory that the ATS and treaties stand at parity with the
generally later-in-time sanctions statutes? Would a jus cogens status of the violation of
international law change the calculus?
81
See, e.g., Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 5–8, Celikgogus v. Rumsfeld, No. 06cv-1996 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2010), ECF No. 43; Reply in Further Support of Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss at 5–7, Celikgogus v. Rumsfeld, Civ. No. 06-cv-1996 (D.D.C. May
21, 2010), ECF No. 46; Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Constitu-
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How should an attorney ethically confront those issues in situations of constitutional doubt? Might such personal risk distort the
way an attorney argued such a case, tilting her judgment towards favoring aggressive assertion of constitutional claims? One scholar has
suggested a clear statement rule presuming that statutory schemes
should be read to allow public interest representation in such circumstances unless there is a clear statement of contrary intent from
82
Congress. The Supreme Court in Humanitarian Law Project, however, failed to read an explicit First Amendment disclaimer in the ma83
terial support statute with any breadth. Perhaps situations where an
attorney-client relationship was created to advance a colorable constitutional claim should be judged with a strong presumption in favor of
counsel—a sort of rule of lenity for public interest representation.
Of course, there are other alternatives to taking one’s chances.
Had the government made an issue of this, then perhaps counsel
84
would have sought specific licenses, pointed to footnote fifteen in
85
Rasul, and/or the due process and other constitutional claims in
86
the original petitions, or simply sought to somehow construe the
claims to fit within another safe harbor of Humanitarian Law Project,
such as that for “independent advocacy” by third parties not coordinating with the blacklisted group or its agents (e.g., the family-

tional Claims at 20–22, Al Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, No. 09-cv-28 (D.D.C. Jun. 26, 2009),
ECF No. 13.
82
I owe this suggestion to Professor Peter Margulies of Roger Williams University
School of Law.
83
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i) (2006); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.
Ct. 2705, 2724–31 (2010).
84
This was done in the recent Al Aulaqi litigation. See Complaint at ¶ 5, ACLU v.
Geithner, No. 10-cv-1303 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2010), ECF No. 1. The downside of a license request, of course, is that it puts the government on notice as to the aid proposed to be provided, which is especially problematic when that aid is legal assistance
in suing the government, and it can be viewed as a tacit admission that the restrictions are otherwise applicable in the absence of specific exemption.
85
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 n.15 (2004)
Petitioners’ allegations—that, although they have engaged neither in
combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have
been held in executive detention for more than two years in territory
subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to counsel and without being charged with
any wrongdoing—unquestionably describe “custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
Id. ((citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)(2006); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259, 277–78, (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring), and cases cited therein”).
86
See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 15–17, Rasul v. Bush, No. 02-cv-299
(D.D.C.
Feb.
19,
2002),
ECF
No.
1,
available
at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/rasulbush021902pet.html.
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member next friends).
The same problems reassert themselves
once detainees are released with their habeas petitions dismissed—
can their attorneys provide services or send them tangible assistance
without falling afoul of the sanctions schemes, especially when, as always, the government has not withdrawn its allegations despite release? Given the intensity of the government’s attempts to date to
88
“[s]ilenc[e] the adversary’s lawyer [as] a means of winning cases”
and indeed the government’s broad assertions of the scope of its detention power, clearly modeled on the material support statute it89
self, it is perhaps surprising that these issues have not been more
thoroughly vetted to date.

87

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2010) (“The statute reaches only material support coordinated with or under the direction of a designated foreign terrorist organization. Independent advocacy . . . is not covered.”).
“We think a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that independently
advocating for a cause is different from providing a service to a group that is advocating for that cause. . . . [A]ny independent advocacy in which plaintiffs wish to engage
is not prohibited by § 2339B.” Id. at 2722. The Court noted government concession
in its briefs that “‘[t]he statute does not prohibit independent advocacy or expression of any kind.’” Id. at 2723. As to future applications of the statute or similar,
novel schemes, “we in no way suggest that a regulation of independent speech would
pass constitutional muster, even if the Government were to show that such speech
benefits foreign terrorist organizations.” Id. at 2730.
88
See Luban, supra note 1, at 2021.
89
See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C.
2005)
In response to the [Court’s] hypotheticals, counsel for the respondents
argued that the Executive has the authority to detain the following individuals until the conclusion of the war on terrorism: “‘[a] little old
lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is a charity that
helps orphans in Afghanistan but [what] really is a front to finance alQaeda activities, . . . a person who teaches English—to the son of an al
Qaeda member, . . . and a journalist who knows the location of Osama
Bin Laden but refuses to disclose it to protect her source.”.
Id. Note that as to the little old lady in the actual hearing, the government answered
that she could be detained, in the military’s discretion. Transcript of Motion to Dismiss at 26, Rasul v. Bush, No. 02-cv-299 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2004) (on file with author).
She would, however, clearly be exempted by the requirement added to the material
support statute by Congress (as a result of government losses in earlier rounds of the
Humanitarian Law Project litigation in the lower courts) mandating that the defendant
have knowledge that the organization was designated as terrorist or engages in terrorism. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, Title VI, Subtitle G, § 6603(c)–(f), 118 Stat. 3762 (amending 18 U.S.C. §
2339B(a)(1)). Similarly, at argument, Judge Green’s hypothetical postulated that
the English teacher taught someone who “the CIA knew” was a member of Al Qaeda.
Transcript of Motion to Dismiss at 27, Rasul v. Bush, No. 02-cv-299 (D.D.C. Dec. 1,
2004). Again, if the teacher lacked such actual knowledge (or perhaps “reason to
know”), it is hard to imagine he / she could be convicted under the statute. See 31
C.F.R. § 595.408(b) (2011).
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In any event, the scheme in place as of Rasul offered little comfort to habeas counsel. Regulations issued in December 2010 have
90
dulled the pressure on public interest lawyers but have not resolved
the ultimate constitutional issue of whether the government may legitimately restrict the ability of attorneys to merely form an attorneyclient relationship with individuals said to be agents of blacklisted or91
ganizations.
90
At least outside of the material support statutory scheme. See infra note 91
(discussing apparent limitations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (2006)).
91
The new regulations were issued in response to a complaint filed to allow the
ACLU and CCR to bring claims in federal court for the benefit of Anwar al-Aulaqi,
who reportedly had been approved for assassination by President Obama but was
himself a designated SDGT. Complaint, ACLU v. Geithner, No. 10-cv-1303 (D.D.C.
Aug. 3, 2010), ECF No. 1; Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 594
(2011); Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 595 (2011); Foreign Terrorist
Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 594, 595, 597 (2011). After the
filing of the complaint, the OFAC issued a license permitting provision of such legal
services, and shortly afterwards, the Al-Aulaqi v. Obama complaint was filed. Al-Aulaqi
v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 54 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing the complaint).
Prior to the Al-Aulaqi controversy, there had been regulations that allowed representation on a variety of issues that did not cover the preliminary injunctive relief
sought by the ACLU and CCR. The GTSR permit provision of legal services to
SDGTs regarding
compliance with the laws of any jurisdiction within the United States . .
. when named as defendants in or otherwise made parties [i.e. involuntarily] to domestic U.S. legal, arbitration, or administrative proceedings
. . . defense of property interests subject to U.S. jurisdiction . . . before
any federal or state agency with respect to the imposition, administration, or enforcement of U.S. sanctions . . . [r]epresentation of persons,
wherever located, detained within the jurisdiction of the United States
or by the United States government, with respect to either such detention or any charges made against such persons . . . and [p]rovision of
legal services in any other context in which prevailing U.S. law requires
access to legal counsel at public expense.
31 C.F.R. § 594.506 (2011). The new rules modify the GTSR to allow, in addition to
the above,
[t]he provision of legal services not otherwise authorized [above] to or
on behalf of persons whose property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to [the GTSR] in connection with the initiation and
conduct of legal, arbitration, or administrative proceedings before any
U.S. federal, state, or local court or agency . . . .
Id. § 594.506(b).
Similar rules were created under another major scheme not discussed above—the
Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (TSR) a sanctions regime created by President
Clinton to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Regulations implementing financial transaction restrictions exist under the material support statute but, presumably,
since these banking regulations do not touch on services, they do not contain a license provision allowing provision of legal services. See id. § 597. Licenses under the
material support statute would still be sought from the Secretary of State (not the
Treasury Secretary) under the statute’s licensing provision, which on its face seems to
provide the Secretary leeway to license only three of the four intangible forms of
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***
A brief word is in order regarding issue conflicts. Although the
detainees share certain common interests against the government,
their interests do not perfectly align and sometimes conflict. Such
situations have been commonplace over the years. Some clients,
cleared for release by President Obama’s Guantánamo Review Task
Force, want the fact of their clearance to be public information; others, not cleared, have an interest in keeping everyone’s clearance status as non-public, “protected” information. There is no limit to such
examples and their existence is not terribly surprising, though it does
occasionally complicate our lives, especially given CCR’s special role
in coordinating the litigation of these cases.
92
Perhaps more interesting is the series of “issue conflicts” that
have arisen between human rights NGOs that historically advocate
broadly on national security, detention, and interrogation issues, and
habeas counsel who represent individual detainees. On a variety of
issues, habeas counsel and the lobbying NGOs have split: on the
question of whether it made sense to close Guantánamo—in symbol,
if not in essence—by moving all the detainees to a federalized prison
in Thomson, Illinois, presumptively with pervasive super-maximum
93
conditions and perhaps also additional public scrutiny; on preference for any trials to take place in Article III courts as opposed to
94
military commissions; and on the wisdom of forming a truth-andreconciliation-style “accountability commission” able to offer immun-

“material support” defined in the statute: “personnel,” “training,” or “expert advice,”
but not “services.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (2006) (“No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the term ‘personnel’, ‘training’, or ‘expert advice
or assistance’ if the provision of that material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization was approved by the Secretary of State with the concurrence of
the Attorney General.”).
Finally, the new regulations also authorize several payment mechanisms. See 31
C.F.R. §§ 594.517, 595.515, 597.505, 597.513 (2011).
92
I use the term here colloquially; these are obviously not “conflicts” in the formal sense in which litigators use the term.
93
See, e.g., Press Release, Constitution Project, Constitution Project Welcomes
Thomson Acquisition if Used for Pre-Trial and Post-Conviction Detention (Dec. 15,
2009),
available
at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/news/2009/12152009n_cpthomson.php.
94
See, e.g., Ten Years After the Attack, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 8, 2011),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/08/ten-years-after-september-11; US: Groups
Urge End to Military Commission Cases, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 12, 2010),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/12/us-groups-urge-end-military-commissionscase-against-child-soldier.
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ity from prosecution as a second-best accountability mechanism. On
all of these issues, the difference of opinion between human rights
groups has generally broken down according to whether the group
represented clients at Guantánamo.
***
Diminished capacity clients always present special problems to
attorneys from the standpoint of professional ethics. These problems
are exacerbated in the unique situation of Guantánamo cases that involve habeas petitions challenging executive detention (i.e., detention in the absence of any prior judicial proceeding) brought in the
first instance almost exclusively by “next friends.” These habeas petitioners were typically not facing any kind of mandatory judicial
process—unlike a defendant who is criminally charged by the government, a habeas petitioner initiates his judicial process at his pleasure. Indeed, the initial demand of the Guantánamo habeas petitioners was simply to be charged. The habeas proceedings were a
voluntary attempt to achieve a change in status. Over the years, many
rational clients have decided that they did not wish to continue their
habeas proceedings often for reasons mundane—“‘If I don’t have an
attorney, I can have a blanket, and I’d rather have a blanket because
96
you can’t do anything for me’” —but often for philosophical reasons
97
as well. As I have noted above, their lawyers have often rationally
questioned, from a philosophical standpoint, whether participation
95

See LISA MAGARRELL, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, U.S. INQUIRY INTO
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE “WAR ON TERROR” (2008), available at
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-USA-Commission-Inquiry-2008-English.pdf
96
See Luban, supra note 1, at 1998 (quoting Telephone Interview with Charles
Swift, Atlanta, Ga. (Dec. 10, 2007)).
97
One ongoing challenge for counsel has been the representation of “refuseniks”—clients who have a next-friend authorization but refuse to come out of their
cells to meet habeas counsel and usually refuse calls and legal mail as well. This is a
familiar situation in the capital appeals context, where it is typical for counsel to be
allowed to walk up to a cell door to communicate with their client, if only to have
that interaction as part of the basis for a competency challenge. At Guantánamo,
habeas counsel have, with one exception, never been allowed to go back into the
housing areas of the camps to meet detainee clients. Instead, when a refusal occurs,
a note can be written and translated, and the staff judge advocate takes it to the prisoner’s cell. In practice, almost no feedback is given on the reasons the client is refusing to come out, if he is refusing at all. See supra note 20; see also supra note 46. Typically medical experts may be given a similar opportunity to examine the prisoner in
an ordinary prison context but not at Guantánamo. See infra note 105. In the exceptional environment of Guantánamo, one could easily argue that counsel have an obligation to pursue direct contact with such refusal clients more vigorously than they
might be ethically obliged to for clients held in ordinary prisons. The same logic
may apply to situations in which clients purport to fire attorneys by mail or other
forms of mediated contact, limiting the ability to observe the clients mental state.
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in the various judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative processes set
98
up at Guantánamo simply served to legitimate them. That lends a
unique color to the evaluation of Guantánamo clients exercising what
are traditionally the last two rights left to prisoners held in the worst
of conditions: the right to fire their lawyers and the right to stop eat99
ing.
Long-term hunger strikers at Guantánamo have posed some of
the most wrenching dilemmas for habeas attorneys. The general
100
consensus has been that when the client is so infirm that he is no
longer able to make an independent rational decision to continue
the hunger strike, the attorney may intervene to seek assistance in
keeping the client alive. This follows the pattern of the model
101
rules.
Difficult questions are posed by the frequent situation in
which the client has not yet progressed to the point of having lost
102
The absolutely
free will, but further deterioration is foreseeable.
brutal treatment of hunger strikers at Guantánamo serves to exacer103
bate what would already be an impossible situation.
The Model
Rules expressly contemplate a situation where the attorney may seek
the appointment of independent third parties, psychiatric experts,
guardians, etc., to essentially serve as neutral referees overseeing the

98

See supra text accompanying note 63.
See, e.g., Toni Locy, Military, Lawyers at Odds Over Gitmo Hunger Strike, USA
TODAY, Sept. 19, 2005, at 19A; Jonathan Mahler, The Bush Administration vs. Salim
Hamdan, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), Jan. 8, 2006, at 10 (“[S]ome detainees told their
American lawyers that they would no longer meet with them, and a number went so
far as to formally fire them.”).
100
We at CCR are fortunate enough not to be lead counsel in any such cases at
present.
101
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) (2004) (stating that an attorney “may take reasonably necessary protective action” on behalf of client with diminished capacity).
102
The government once attempted
to ban lawyers from one major law firm from visiting the base altogether, in part because the Defense Department claimed the lawyers had
advised a hunger striking client that the United States lacked authorization to feed hunger-striking detainees indefinitely. In fact, the hunger striking client had been told by the military—incorrectly—that
there was an order from the federal district court requiring them to
force-feed him through an enteral tube. In response to a request from
their client, counsel merely clarified that no such order had been issued in his habeas proceeding.
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & REPRIEVE, supra note 41, at 14–15.
103
See Letter from Counsel for Twenty-Six Hunger Strikers to Robert M. Gates,
Def. Sec’y Sandra Hodgkinson, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Detainee Affairs, &
Alan Liotta, Principal Dir. of the Office of Detainee Affairs (Mar. 12, 2009) (on file
with author).
99
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attorney-client relationship in such difficult circumstances. At various points during the Guantánamo litigation, however, access to the
clients by such third parties has been next to impossible given the attitude of the government and the courts. The number of independent psychiatric evaluations that have been allowed to take place at
the base at the behest of habeas or defense counsel can be counted
on the fingers of one hand. “Next friends” might typically serve in a
105
role akin to guardians—but here, most are other prisoners.
What
then?
***
We are seemingly a long way removed from the days when our
mere participation in these cases—in the early commissions process,
in monitored habeas visits, or in the HVD cases under the strictures
of the TS/SCI protective order—itself raised ethical questions. Perhaps the surest reassurance of legitimacy came from the fact that during the Bush administration, the government had been trying so
steadfastly to keep civilian lawyers out of these cases. Most of the
problems described above have been motivated by the desire of our
party-opponent to drive us out of the picture in order to reinforce
isolation and dependency in the prisoners and cover up abuses. At
the same time, those abuses and the lack of process made mere access
extraordinarily valuable. In contrast, the new administration seems
eager to have lawyers in the process: witness the provision for some
form of outside representation in the Periodic Review Board process
104
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) (2004) (“[R]easonably necessary protective action [may] includ[e] consulting with individuals or entities that
have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking
the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.”); see id. cmts. 5–6.
105
The first burst of individual petitions filed after Rasul involved relatives as
“next friends,” but locating them was backbreaking and risky work, resulting in two
attorneys being detained by the secret police of detainees’ home countries. Eventually counsel began filing petitions based on next friend authorizations from other
prisoners—those first clients whose relatives had authorized their petitions. The military initially allowed visits by such counsel, then fought the validity of the “prisoner
next friend” petitions, and eventually lost in court. See, e.g., Adem v. Bush, 425 F.
Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2006). While these legal struggles went on, however, various detainees spent months waiting to meet their counsel, in some cases informing the lawyers that they were cleared by their Combatant Status Review Tribunals. See, e.g., id.
at 9 (“Adem has now had a lawyer for nearly a year. However, it is unclear if Adem
even knows that his lawyer exists because Respondents refuse to acknowledge counsel’s authority to represent him.”). In one instance, a detainee who was on a list of
men scheduled for release died shortly after his first attorney visit was authorized by
court order. See Motion for Order Requiring Respondents to Allow Counsel to Meet
with Petitioner In-Person, Al-Habardi v. Bush, No. 05-1857 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 2006),
ECF No. 15; First Declarations of George Daly & Jeffrey J. Davis, Al-Habardi v. Bush,
No. 05-1857 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 2006), ECF No. 16.
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106

recently created by Executive Order 13,567 on March 7, 2011.
At
the same time, the legal standards that apply in the habeas litigation
are, for all practical purposes, approaching those that the Bush administration argued for in the immediate wake of the Rasul deci107
sion.
For years, habeas lawyers have essentially adhered to Woody
Allen’s maxim that eighty percent of success was showing up. In habeas, where the case moves forward at the will of the detainee and the
detainee is the one seeking to change the status quo, it is understandable that the value of the lawyer’s presence to further the detainee’s best interests might go unquestioned. But here we are faced
with a process that is no longer, by and large, designed to isolate de108
tainees or hide visibly brutal abuses, but rather is skewed towards
perpetuating the perception of legal order and due process by an
administration that depends on that perception to make continued
detention politically palatable. Will there come a point at which the
most effective—the most loyal—advocacy will involve refusing to par109
ticipate in that process?

106

Exec. Order No.13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011).
At the time, the Bush administration argued that “some evidence” should be
the standard of proof and that the scope of review should to be limited to examination of a cold administrative record. For a discussion of the divergent standards applied by the courts of appeals, see supra note 26.
108
Two points bear repeating here: even with the great improvement that the
transition in administration has brought for the majority of detainees at Guantánamo: (1) the HVDs and the hunger strikers still face inhumane conditions, and (2)
the lack of any certainty about when they might be released is an awful burden to
bear even, and perhaps especially so, for those detainees cleared for release and not
in the two aforementioned categories still facing the worst conditions.
109
One habeas attorney recently dismissed two appeals from denials of the writ on
the rationale, essentially, that it was now hopeless to proceed in light of the state of
the case law in the D.C. Circuit. See Benjamin Wittes, Two Guantanamo Detainees Drop
Appeal,
LAWFARE
BLOG
(June
2,
2011,
4:08
PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/06/two-guantanamo-detainees-drop-appeals (describing the detainees’ decisions in Al-Assani v. Obama and Al-Nahdi v. Obama to dismiss their habeas appeals).
107

